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PUBLIC DEBT BOUNDARIES: A REVIEW
OF THEORIES AND METHODS





"The progress of the enormous debts which at present oppress,
and will in the long-run probably ruin, all the great nations of Europe, has been
pretty uniform".  Although this was said two centuries ago, it is still equally1
applicable. In the majority of countries, public debt is accumulating and is still
considered as a calamity for macroeconomic stability; in many countries, especially
the ones that have experienced debt crisis, it causes fear of great disturbances and
the breakdown of the state. However, due to a number of advantages over taxes,
countries unwillingly renounce debt as a source of financing, especially in periods
of extremely high, although short-term demand for public expenditures (wars,
natural disasters, economic crises). The attraction of debt on the one hand and the
danger lurking as a consequence of excessively enjoying in the benefits of the debt
on the other hand, require constant caution and attention when using this fiscal
policy instrument.
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It was this very necessity of rational debt management that
stimulated economic science to study the public debt phenomenon, its causes and
consequences, and to set optimal levels and sustainable boundaries of debt.
Regardless of how fruitful this studying was, its accomplishments today merely
enable the understanding of the debt-related problems, without providing unique
guidelines for conducting fiscal policy, i.e. borrowing policy. 
The paper consists of five chapters. The first chapter deals with
some simple ways of determining limits to public debt. Chapter two deals with
methods of assessment of long-term public debt sustainability, grouping them into
three basic groups: methods of assessment by adopting the solvency approach;
methods of monitoring dynamics of the debt/GDP ratio; and time series analysis
methods. The third chapter explains the Maastricht fiscal criterion for admission
to the European Monetary Union. The fourth chapter gives a short overview of
theories which, by applying the positive, i.e. standard approach, try to explain the
causes of the appearance of public debt. The fifth chapter contains a review of the
methods of assessment of public debt sustainability and the appraisal of their
applicability in the case of the Republic of Croatia.
2
SOME SIMPLE METHODS OF ASSESSMENT
OF PUBLIC DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 
History has shown that different economies cope with the debt
burden in different ways. Sometimes crises appear even at low levels of share in the
debt of the gross domestic product (GDP), whereas some economies function very
well even when their public debt significantly exceeds the value of the total one-year
production in the country. Consequently, we can not talk about the existence of
absolute and universal boundaries of public debt. However, it can be said that these
boundaries are reached when fiscal policy objectives are jeopardized. In general, it
is sometimes said that the optimum of public debt is not reached until additional
public expenditures (total or a specific form of public expenditures, e.g., public
investments) that are financed by debt:
         - increase the use of production capacities,
         - increase or improve production capacity of the economy, and
         - enable the approaching to the desired distribution
(Br@ummerhoff, 1996)
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The basic macroeconomic identities Y = C + I + G + X = C + S + T + U serve as2
the starting point.  It follows therefore that (G - T) = (S - I) + (U - X).  The expression
on the left-hand side is fiscal deficit/surplus, i.e. the difference between public
investments and public savings, and the second expression in brackets on the
right-hand side of the equation is the deficit/surplus on the balance-of-payments
current account.
Similarly, sometimes it is simply considered that new borrowing
is a "wise" move if it is consistent with other macroeconomic goals (current account
balance, growth of private investments, inflation control, maintaining external
credibility). If one assumes that all investments in economy should equal the total
savings of residents and foreigners, and if new public sector borrowing, i.e. public
sector deficit, is considered as the difference between public investments and public
savings, then this deficit is balanced by savings of other sectors of domestic
economy and/or external deficit (deficit on balance-of-payments current account).
Consequently, the wisdom of new borrowing depends on the level of private
savings, on the desired levels of private investments, and the desired deficit on the
balance-of-payments current account.2
Since the above mentioned criteria of desirability of borrowing
are hard to quantify, some simpler ratios are often applied as indicators of
borrowing and the possibility of further borrowing, such as:
         - the ratio of interest paid on public debt and collected taxes. This
ratio shows to what extent the burden of interest is covered
with tax revenues. 
         - the ratio of interest and public expenditures. This indicator
shows which share of public expenditures is "tied" due to public
debt repayment obligation.
         - the interest/GDP ratio. Interest is put into a ratio with GDP
because the tax revenues from which the debt obligation needs
to be met depend on GDP.
         - the new borrowing/public expenditures ratio.
         - the share of new borrowing (i.e. deficit) in GDP, and
         - the share of total debt in GDP.
The last two are the most frequent and most important ones,
and they also serve to define the criteria for admission to the European Monetary
Union (Br@ummerhoff, 1996).
These indicators do not show whether the public debt limit has
been reached; however, if they are monitored over a longer period of time, they can
be used for monitoring the dynamics of borrowing. Besides, these indicators are
used in international debt comparisons. 
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Experience of many countries has shown that there is a close link between the levels,3
i.e. trends, of the total public debt and total external debt. This link exists because the
state itself creates a large portion of the external debt. Besides, with its policy of
accumulating debt, it makes people expect tax increase, inflation and devaluation, thus
encouraging the private sector to take the capital out of the country, which creates a
need for external borrowing in the private sector as well.
Public debt may be divided in internal and external public debt.
In many countries, when possibilities of borrowing in the country are exhausted,
the government turns to borrowing abroad. Since foreign debt can be serviced only
through exports, the external public debt/exports ratio is used as an indicator of the
external foreign debt level sustainability.3
Besides the above simple indicators of indebtedness, a whole
array of methods has been developed for assessing the long-term sustainability of
the existing borrowing policy. These methods can be divided into three basic
categories:
         - methods of assessment by using the solvency approach,
         - methods of monitoring the trend of debt as a share of GDP,
         - time series analysis methods (Heinemann, 1992).
It should be explained at the very beginning what sustainability
of a borrowing policy means. There is no unique and generally acceptable definition
of the sustainability of borrowing policy. At the same time, there is a higher degree
of agreement about unsustainability. Any borrowing policy that is not
unsustainable is frequently considered sustainable. In simple terms, a government
debt policy is unsustainable if private subjects, both domestic and foreign, consider
it as such. This means, for instance, that creditors, doubting a country's credibility,
i.e. its ability to repay loans, will suspend further granting of loans and demand risk
premiums. Domestic creditors may, for instance, expect a tax increase and
emission of money in the future, as well as related inflation, and even devaluation,
which can all lead to reduced domestic currency savings, taking capital abroad, and
finally to a financial crisis or balance-of-payments crisis. This scenario is common
for countries with undeveloped financial markets (the IMF Institute, 1993). In
countries with developed financial markets an unsustainable borrowing policy may
cause a rise in the supply of government bonds, which leads to a drop in their
prices and a rise in interest rates. State creditors will demand an even higher
increase in interest rates if bonds are not indexed, and will also seek protection
from possible loss by demanding risk premiums (Masson, 1985). In the Sargent
and Wallace (1981) scenario, under the same conditions, an unsustainable debt
policy will lead to a drop in the demand for government bonds and an increase in
CROATIAN ECONOMIC SURVEY 591996 - 1999
bond interest rates, which will prevent the state from possibility to control the
money supply growth rate and the inflation rate.
3
METHODS OF ASSESSMENT OF THE SUSTAINABILITY
OF THE PUBLIC DEBT POLICY 
3.1 Methods of assessment by
using the solvency approach 
Methods of assessment of sustainability of the public debt policy
by using the solvency approach take a country's "budget constraint" as the starting
point. The government budget identity was "discovered" in the 1960's and 1970's
and was a result of the critique of the Keynesian model (Haliassos and Tobin,
1990). Unlike the Keynesian approach to deficit and debt, the methods of analysis
of the financial policy of a country, which use the budget identity of that country
as a starting point, stress the importance of the form of financing of the budget
deficit, i.e. debt.
Budget identity is actually the balance of government receipts
and expenditures. Although the budget identity is often called budget constraint,
it does not represent a constraint in itself, but the constraint consists of the limits
explicitly or implicitly set for a country's possibility to issue a new debt, of the
minimum level of the foreign exchange reserves set by the government itself , and
also of the limitations of real resources that the government (under given political
and economic circumstances) may collect by issuing money (Buiter, 1985).
In the most general form, budget identity in a given period of
time contains the following elements:
money issue + new debt issue + sale of state property /
/ government expenditures + interest on existing public debt - taxes - 
- revenues from government property
The right side of this identity actually represents the financial
deficit of the public sector, while the left side shows in what ways this deficit can
be financed (Buiter, 1985).
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This expression is obtained starting from expression (2).  If elements of expression (2)4
are shown as a share of Y , and Y  = (1 + n) Y , then:t t t-1
  B          B   (1 + n)      G  - Tt  t-1 t t  (2a)     ))  - )))))))))))))))) = )))))   .
  Y          Y  (1 + n)          Yt t-1 t
For sufficiently small r and n, we can say that (1+r) / (1+n) = 1 + r - n, so the
expression (2a) can be written as 
b  - b  (1+ r - n) = g  - t  , i.e.t t-1 t t
  (2b)  b  - b  =  g  - t  + ( r - n) bt t-1 t t t-1
If  the  government  borrows  again, and b  - b  is a new fiscal deficit, the difference t  t-1
g  - t  is t  t
positive and equal to primary surplus (negative primary deficit), and from the
expression (2b) follows that 
  (3)   d  = b  - b  = - p + (r-n) bt t t-1 t-1
In these expressions Y is the real output, g is the share of government expenditures
(without interest) in the output, and t is the share of government revenues in the
output.
In the literature on sustainable debt level, the above identity is
mostly presented in a simplified way, such as:
(1)  M  - M  + B  - B  = G  + iB  - T    ,t t-1 t t-1 t t-1 t
N N N N N N N
where M is the monetary base, B is the  total public debt, G is government
expenditures (minus interest), and is the nominal interest rate, T is government
revenues, and t is the period of time. N in superscript indicates that these are
nominal values.
For the sake of simplicity, budget identity for a certain period of
time is most frequently used in the following form:
(2)  B  - B  = G  + rB  - T   , t  t-1  t  t-1  t
where real values for B, G, and T appear, and where r is the real interest rate (r =
i - B), and where the possibility of financing deficit by issue of money is neglected.
From this identity the usual debt sustainability criterion is derived; therefore:
(3)  d  = b  - b  = -p + (r - n) b    , t  t  t-1  t-1
4
where d is the share of the  total real deficit in real output, b is the share of real debt
in  real  output, p is the share of primary deficit in output (g  - t  , t  t
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Primary deficit/surplus is the difference between the total revenues of the government5
and total expenditures less interest payments.  Primary deficit/surplus is calculated in
order to gain an insight into current activities of the state, i.e. in order to eliminate the
effects of earlier activities (earlier borrowing) on the government budget.
Ponzi games or schemes - an investment scam where high and quick profits from6
fictitious sources are promised.  A profit is paid to the first investors from the funds
received from the stakes of subsequent investors.  The term was named after Charles
Ponzi (1882-1949), a speculator who organized such schemes in the USA 1919-20.
The terms usually used in Croatia are fraudulent investment scheme and fortune
chains.
where  g   is  bigger  than  t ),  and  n  is  the  real output growth rate.  This t  t
5
expression shows that, if the growth rate is lower than the interest rate and if the
government wants to keep the proportion of public debt in GDP the same as in the
previous period, then it has to run the primary surplus. In case that the growth rate
is higher than the interest rate, the government can run the primary deficit, too,
without increasing the proportion of the debt in GDP. It is said that in that case
the government can play the "honest Ponzi game"  and continually repay old debt6
by issuing new debt, without increasing its debt/GDP ratio (Buiter, 1985; Spaventa,
1987).
If the possibility of monetary financing of deficit is taken into
account, the expression (3) changes into 
(4)  b  - b  = - p + (r - n) b  - (M   - M ) / Y t  t-1  t-1  t   t-1   t
Due to cyclical oscillations in the economy, a fiscal deficit in a
period of time, or in a few subsequent periods of time, does not need to be
considered as a sign of long-term unsustainability of fiscal policy if there is a
probability that a period of surplus will follow after that.  Therefore, as a rule, rather
than meeting the budgetary constraint in a certain period of time, the meeting of
intertemporal budgetary constraint is considered more important, which requires
balancing of the total realized deficits and surpluses in a longer period.
Intertemporal budgetary constraint is shown in a discontinuous
form as
       j
(5)  B  = E (G  - T  )  + B  (1 + r)   ,j t t 0
j-t  j
      t=1
or in a continual form and in output expressions as 
       j
(6)  b  = I p  e  dt + b  e   ,j j  0
(r-n)(j-t)  (r-n)j
      0
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The expressions (7) and (8) are obtained by discounting the expressions (5) and (6) to7
period 0, and the limit value is sought when j converges toward the infinite, because
the sustainability condition is met when b  converges toward b  when j convergesj 0
toward the infinite.
where this form is obtained by discounting of  expressions (2) and (3), respectively,
and adding up the corresponding expressions for each future period. The subscript
j in the above expressions marks the total number of periods.
If the sustainable fiscal policy requirement is that debt, or a
share of the debt in the output, converges to the initial level B0, it means that the
sustainability condition is in the discontinuous form 
           Bj
(7)  lim )))))))   = 0
j64  (1 + r)j
or in the continual form
(8)  lim   b  e  = 0 j
-(r-n)j 7
 j64
Accordingly, inter-temporal budgetary constraint is met if
    j
   E (G  - T )t t     t=1
(9)    ))))))) ))) = -B   ,0




(10)  I p  e  dt = -bj 0
-(r-n)j
0
This means that fiscal policy is sustainable if present discounted
value of expected future debt converges toward zero, i.e. if the present discounted
value of the share of primary deficit in output equals the negative current value of
the share of output. Accordingly, an indebted government sooner or later needs to
run a primary surplus big enough to meet the above equations (Heinemann, 1992;
Blanchard et al., 1990; Spaventa, 1987). Conditions (7) or (8) respectively, that
current value of future debt should equal zero, allows financing of the existing debt
by new borrowing ("rolling over" into the future), but in such case it requires that
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For the sake of simplicity, revenues from seigniorage are included into tax revenues as8
a special type of tax.
real debt should grow at a rate lower than the real interest rate (Heinemann, 1992).
If the possibility of monetary financing of the deficit is allowed,
the intertemporal budgetary constraint implies that the public debt value should
be equal to the sum of the present value of expected future primary surpluses and
the present value of expected future receipts from issuing money (seigniorage)
(Buiter, 1985).
Intertemporal budgetary identity may also be understood as
public sector balance, where government liabilities consist of the current stock of
public debt and present value of expected future expenditures (without interest
payments). Government assets consist of the current stock of (domestic and
foreign) government assets and the present value of expected future government
revenues. The difference between assets and liabilities is the net value of a
government. A government is solvent, i.e. public debt is sustainable in the
long-term if the net value of the government is positive. A balance of the
government may be presented as the following identity 
(11)  eA  + T/(1+r) = G / (1+r) + B  + eB  + K , f  d  f 8
from which follows sustainability condition
(12)  (T-G) / (1+r) + eA  - (B + eB ) = K   ,f  f 0
where A is the foreign exchange reserves expressed in foreign currency, e is the real
exchange rate of domestic currency, K is the government net value, while the
superscripts f and d next to B indicate the foreign, i.e. domestic component of
public debt. All the values in the above expressions are stated in present values,
which are obtained by discounting, where interest rate decreased by GDP long-term
growth rate is used as the discount rate (Guidotti and Kumar, 1991).
Despite the fact that solvency approach, i.e. public sector
balance approach is most frequently used as a method of assessment of borrowing
policy, the application of that approach causes a number of technical obstacles. The
basic obstacle is that this approach implies selection of a long-term real interest rate
and a long-term real output growth rate, as well as the forecast of future primary
deficits (Masson, 1985). Besides, the sustainability criterion which requires that
debt growth rate should be lower than the interest rate, can also be satisfied if the
share of the debt in the output grows, as in a case when the output growth rate is
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The condition that the ratio of debt and nominal GDP be stable can be written as:9
   d (B/PY) / dt  
  (13a)    )))))))) = 0
      B/PY
The numerator of this expression is:
  d (B/PY)     dB   B       BdP      BdY
  (13b)   ))))))  =  )))  ))  -   )))  +  )))) 
   dt         PY    B    ‰ PYP      YPY   
If dP/P=A, dY/Y=n, and dB/B= ß, then expression (13b) may be written as 
  d (B/PY)           B                     
  (13c)   ))))))  = )))  ” ß - (B + n ) › ,
       dt               PY
so the condition of stability (13a) becomes ß = B + n.
lower than the debt growth rate, which in turn, is lower than the real interest rate.
However, with the ever-increasing ratio of debt and output, the share of primary
surplus in the output must grow constantly so that the debt growth rate remains
lower than the interest rate. This, of course, is difficult to achieve, primarily if we
keep in mind the distorting character of taxes and rigidity of public expenditures
(Heinemann, 1992).
This is why we sometime use the sustainability approach, the
aim of which is to stabilize the existing ratio of debt and output.
3.2 Methods of monitoring the trends
of debt as a share of GDP 
In order for the borrowing policy to be sustainable, it is
sometimes considered that the deficit does not necessarily have to be zero; instead,
the aim is to stabilize the ratio of the nominal debt (B) and the nominal GDP (PY).
The simplest approach to such conception of debt sustainability says that the
growth rate of debt share in nominal output should be equal to the sum of the price
growth rate and the real output growth rate (Gordon, 1993)
(13)  $ = B + n  ,9
where $ is the growth rate of nominal debt.
From expression (13) follows that, if debt stability requirement
is accepted, deficit may be as high as:
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Domar assumes a constant growth rate of n% annually, i.e. Y=ae .  Then: 10 nt
                             a   t  t
  (15a)    I Ydt = a I e  dt = ))  (e  - 1)nt nt
                              n0 0
If the debt is a constant part of revenues, it is clear that the debt will also rise at the
rate of n%, so total debt in a certain period of time totals 
                         a
  (15b)    B  = B  + " ))  (e  - 1)  .t 0
nt
            n
                           
Then the ratio of debt and output is
 B             B           "t 0
  (15c)    )))  =  ))))))  +  ))  (1 - e )  .-nt
 Y        a (e  - 1)    nt
nt
Consequently, there follows 
         B        "                                     r       "
  (15d)    lim  ))  =  ))   ,    and       lim k =  )))  . ))  r  ,
t64   Y        n                        t64       n        n
                                                        ))  r
                                                            "
                                                                                                                       
where k is the tax rate required for debt servicing.
(14)  $B = (B + n) B.
Domar (1944) also took the idea of unchangeable debt/GDP
ratio as his starting point and he created one of the first models of rise in debt
burden. With that model Domar showed that the higher the growth rate is, the
lower the interest rate on that debt is, and the higher portion of income that
citizens are ready to put aside for buying state bonds is, the smaller the debt burden
(tax rate required for debt servicing) will be (Domar, 1944).
Expressed in symbols: 
                    r     "(15)  lim   k =  ))))))    .  ))  r . 10
t64          n               n                ))  + r                                       "
Stabilization of the debt/GDP ratio is the aim of the European
Commission (1990) in evaluating the current public debt policy. It also takes as its
starting point the budget identity of a country for a certain period of time expressed
as a portion in GDP, thus coming to the expression for primary surplus, s0,
required for stabilizing the debt/GDP ratio, provided that the interest rate is higher
than the output growth rate (in the opposite case each primary surplus is
sustainable because each debt/GDP ratio converges toward a finite value).   
This expression can be presented as follows:
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Intertemporal budget constraint may be written as 11
 B    (1+r) B  Y       (1+r) (G  - T  ) Yt+1 t t t t t
  (16a)    )))  - )))))))))))  = )))))))))))))))))   ,
Y     Y  Y                   Y  Y     t+1 t+1 t t+1 t
i.e. in GDP terms, as 
            (1+r)          (1+r)
  (16b)    b   -  ))))))  b   =  ))))  st+1 t
           (1+n)          (1+n)
The solution of this differential equation is:
                  s(1+r)       1+r      s (1+r)t
  (16c)    b  =   b   -  )))))))      ))))  +  )))))   .t 0        —           r-n       —  1+n       r - n
Hence the expression (16) for surplus s , with which the share of debt in GDP is not0
changed, i.e., b  = b  .t 0
        b  (r-n)     0
11
(16)  s  =   ))))))) .0
        1 + r 
The difference between s  (the desirable primary surplus in0
GDP) and s (the real primary surplus) may be applied as a sustainability indicator.
One shortcoming of that indicator is that it can show that any debt level is
sustainable as long as it is stable.
3.3 Time series analysis methods
In the last decade, debt sustainability has been tested by the time
series analysis method. This method starts from the idea that long-term debt trend
is of key importance for the sustainability issue. A debt is sustainable if it can be
shown that during a longer period of time with unchanged debt policy, primary
deficit and surplus values are balanced. A review of possible sustainability tests by
using the time series analysis method was first provided by Hamilton and Flavin
(Heinemann, 1992). They suggest testing of a hypothesis that the expected present
value of future debt equals zero, which means that the current debt is equal to the
present value of future surpluses
                        (G  - T  ) j t t
(17a)  H  : B  = E  E )))))))  ,0 0 j
                       (1 + r)t=1 t
or equivalently, that the expected debt issue will not grow at a rate higher than the
interest rate
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                     Bj
(17b)  H  : E   lim  )))))  = 0 ,0 j
              (1 + r)j64 j
where E is the expected value.
If tests show that this hypothesis can be accepted, then the debt
policy is sustainable. For testing the null-hypothesis, Hamilton and Flavin propose
the Dickey-Fuller unit root test for testing the non-stationarity of real debt and
surplus, the generalized Flood-Garber test and the limited Flood-Garber test
(Hamilton and Flavin, 1986).
The Hamilton- Flavin evaluation of sustainability is not
applicable to growing economies, in which it makes no sense to assume the
stationarity of primary surplus series and expect stationary series of real debt.
Therefore, Trehan and Walsh (1988) propose a more general approach to the
evaluation of sustainability with the time series analysis method, assuming
stochastic behavior of government revenues and expenditures.
Although they are appropriate because they monitor long-term
behavior of debt, which is in line with the approach of intertemporal budget
constraint, the time series analysis methods face criticism because they look at the
past movements of debt and use them as a basis for conclusions about future
sustainability of these trends.
4
MAASTRICHT CRITERION
OF PUBLIC DEBT SUSTAINABILITY
In 1991 the European Community Governments agreed that the
countries would have to meet four convergence criteria in order to be admitted to
the European Monetary Union (EMU). Apart from the four monetary criteria - low
inflation, stable exchange rate and low interest rates, the fiscal criterion appears as
the fourth one. According to that criterion, the general government deficit should
be lower than 3 percent of annual GDP, and public debt of the overall public sector
should be lower than 60 percent of GDP, so that a country could join the EMU.
The Delors Report states that monetary union without fiscal convergence could
cause monetary and economic instability (Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini, 1993).
Since a large number of the EU countries currently do not meet
the above mentioned fiscal criterion, same as the majority of "candidates" for
admission to the EMU, fiscal rules are alleviated by allowing the possibility of
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According to the sustainability criteria12
  (2b) bt  - b   = g   - t   + ib   - wb  N N N N N Nt -1 t t t -1 t -1
  
where g   - t   + ib   is total (conventional) deficit, sot t t -1
N N N
b   - b   = d   - wb   .t t -1 t t -1
N N N N
If the sustainability request is set according to which the debt/GDP ratio should be
constant, i.e.,
b   - b   = 0, then d   = wb  .t t -1 t t -1
N N N N
Accordingly, with the debt of 0.60 and nominal growth rate 0.05 (0.03 + 0.02), deficit
according to this formula should amount to 0.03 (3 percent) of GDP.
"multilateral supervision", which leaves certain discretionary space for national
fiscal policy activities.
Although reference values of 3 percent of GDP for deficit and 60
percent of GDP for public debt seem to be determined arbitrarily, they follow
certain logic. First, these values of debt and deficit are close to average values in the
countries of the European Community, which in 1991 were 61.7 percent of GDP
for public debt and 4.3 percent of GDP for deficit.
There is also a link between the values of 3 percent of GDP for
deficit and 60 percent of GDP for public debt. More precisely, if we take that a
normal long-term GDP growth rate in the European Union is 3 percent, and
inflation is 2 percent, this nominally implies a growth rate of (approximately) 5
percent. By applying the sustainability conditions referred to in expressions (2b) and
(3), we can easily show that, with this nominal GDP growth rate, the debt of 60
percent of GDP is compatible with the very deficit of 3 percent of GDP (Buiter,
Corsetti and Roubini, 1993; "Institut Finanzen und Steuern", 1993).12
Despite the fact that these criteria of convergence have not been
determined randomly, they are still not the best choice and they are already being
questioned in the EU countries. There are several reasons for this. First, it is
difficult to find a reason for their existence; second, they are too restrictive even for
the EU members, and third, countries differ significantly in their economic
structure and initial conditions, so what is optimal (or sustainable) for one
economy does not necessarily have to be optimal for the other. Finally, experience
shows that countries are very resourceful in finding ways of how to formally avoid
the criteria formed in this manner (Von Hagen, 1990).
Nevertheless, each country (including Croatia) that intends to
become a member of the EMU one day should, while implementing a borrowing
policy, take into account whether it meets the Maastricht criterion of fiscal policy
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convergence. On the other hand, it is equally necessary for each country, even if it
meets that criterion, to take care of the sustainability of its current deficit and debt
policies in given circumstances.
5
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC DEBT
The sustainability of public debt policy has not always been a
central topic in the studies of public debt. Classical research areas related to public
debt were on the debt burden and the intertemporal debt effects. Only lately has the
focus been shifted to public debt determinants, and the explanation of these
determinants has taken two courses, one using the normative approach and the
other using the positive approach. Reviewing the sustainability issues is a part of
the positive approach to determining the causes of public debt.
The main advocate of the normative approach to public debt is
Robert Barro (1979), and Lucas and Stockey are close to him in their ways of
thinking. Barro and his followers observe the state as a "benevolent social planner"
whose aim is to maximize the welfare of members of the society. They believe that
the effects of fiscal policy (that is - taxation) are least distorted if tax rates are
constantly kept on the same level. Since economies pass through periods of
expansion and periods of recession, with constant tax rates they will undergo
alternate periods of budget deficit and budget surplus. Also, the appearance of
deficit or surplus will depend on the effect that some external factors have on public
expenditures. Thus, debt will be used in periods of temporary increase in public
expenditures (especially in periods of war and big crises), while in post-war
(post-crisis) periods unchanged rates will generate budget surplus which will
compensate for the present deficit in terms of its current value (Heinemann, 1992;
Alesina and Perotti, 1994). In other words, the idea of this approach is that tax
rates "smoothed out with time" will have the most neutral effect on the economy.
This is why this approach is sometimes called "equilibrium approach to fiscal
policy" or "tax smoothing policy". The appearance of public debt is only a logical
result of pursuing such a policy in the periods when it is justified.
This is the explanation of the appearance of debt in line with
Barro's theory of neutrality of debt, i.e. of equal effects of tax financing and debt
financing (1974). According to Barro, debt issuance has no influence on wealth,
aggregate demand, interest rates and formation of capital, its only function is to
provide greater flexibility for the government in intertemporal balancing of public
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revenues and public expenditures (Barro and Grilli, 1994).
The normative approach can however, only exceptionally be
confirmed by real data, and it can not explain either the appearance of high and
permanent deficits in many countries in the time of peace, or difference in the
levels of deficit in countries with similar economic circumstances.
Therefore, as an alternative to this neoclassical normative
approach, there emerges a positive approach to the explanation of the appearance
and trends of public debt. This approach abandons the presumption of the state as
a benevolent social planner, and considers that politicians decide on source of
financing on the basis of their own interest and specific limitations set up by
institutional environment (Heinemann, 1992).
The members of the "public choice school" (Buchanan, Brannan,
Tulock, and Niskanen) can be included among the advocates of the positive
approach. They believe that excessive deficit tendencies may emerge from
self-willed behavior of politicians and bureaucrats, whose aim is to secure
re-election and keep their power and related benefits (Rolf, 1996). In order to
explain the appearance of deficit and public debt, members of the public choice
school presume the existence of a fiscal illusion and asymmetry of the
Keynesian-type stabilization policies.
Models of the members of the so-called "new political economy"
are also based on the positive approach. They stress the strategic importance of
fiscal deficit. They presume that fiscal policy of the current government may
determine the fiscal policy of its successor, so the current government is using it for
their strategic goals. New political economy says that fiscal deficit and debt are
aggregate results of a political conflict among various groups of citizens (present and
future politicians) that has arisen as a result of a dispute about the structure of
expenses (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990) or about overall expenditures (Persson and
Svensson, 1989).
A similar group of models, which have adopted the positive
approach in explaining public debt, claims that debt is a consequence of strategic
conflicts among political parties and social groups exerting simultaneous pressure
on political decisions. In line with that, Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b) indicate
that in modern democracies, public debt increases with the number of parties in
a coalition government, i.e. with the number of various groups influencing the
structure and size of the budget.
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1990) prove that deficit is
correlated with permanence of the government; long-lasting governments have
lower deficits. This is in line with the findings of Roubini and Sachs, because
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Weingeist, Shepsle and Johnson (Alesina and Perotti, 1994) have dealt with these13
models.
Universalism is a feature of the budget that contains a little bit of everything for14
everybody.
Reciprocity emerges when on enactment of the budget one representative makes an15
agreement with another one that, in exchange for the same benefit, he will not oppose
his proposal.
coalition governments usually rule for a shorter period of time.
The next group of models with the positive approach presumes
that geographic affiliation of parliament members may cause excessive spending.13
The models presuming that budgetary institutions determine
the size of the budget and the deficit also use the positive analysis. A large budget
and fiscal deficit are a consequence of the lack of fiscal discipline, while tighter fiscal
discipline is enabled by those budgetary institutions that provide strong prerogatives
to a prime minister or finance minister, limit universalism , reciprocity  and14 15
parliamentary amendments and facilitate strict execution of the budget law
(Alesina and Perotti, 1994).
Models based on the positive approach to deficit and public debt
are empirically much more confirmed than the models based on the normative
approach. In other words, the very fact that in modern democracies politicians
behave like any other citizens, in some way pursuing their own benefit instead of
social welfare, explains the recent appearance of relatively high deficits and public
debt. The political attractiveness of debt suggested by the positive approach may,
accordingly, take borrowing even across sustainable limits. This justifies the need
for monitoring the dynamics of borrowing by revealing sustainable levels of public
debt and by limiting growth of debt when it exceeds the sustainability limit.
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6
EVALUATION OF SUSTAINABILITY OF BORROWING
POLICY IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
After the elaborate presentation of a number of possible
methods of evaluation of sustainability of the current state borrowing policy, one
can logically ask oneself which of these methods could be applied in order to
establish whether the current dynamics of borrowing in the Republic of Croatia is
sustainable in a long run. Due to a number of objective obstacles, the evaluation
of debt sustainability in our case is more difficult. First, we still lack a reliable and
complete database. Then, even if it existed, public debt time series would be too
short to be used for analyzing future debt trends. Finally, since the last five years
can be considered as not typical due to war and post-war reconstruction on the one
hand and difficulties in obtaining foreign loans on the other, changes of debt in that
period are not a result of the "normal" inclination of our country to borrowing. On
top of all of this, it is difficult today to determine the nominal GDP long-term
growth rate, as well as the long-term interest rate, which would be necessary to
calculate the sustainable public debt level.
Still, certain conclusions about the sustainable public debt level
could be made by studying the current state of public debt. First, the current share
of debt in GDP can be compared with the Maastricht criterion. Further, (as
suggested by expression (12)), net current value of the state can be evaluated with
the application of various combinations of growth rates of GDP and interest rates.
Also, by assuming different GDP growth rates, interest rates,
and shares of debt in GDP, values of future expenses for interest could be simulated
and it could be assessed whether these expenditures are sustainable or not. The
amount of primary surplus needed for long-term stabilization of the share of public
debt in GDP can be calculated from current data, and this amount can be
compared with the existing primary surplus. Finally, we can start calculating simple
ratios (see part 2) and comparing them with indicators of the same kind calculated
for various economies. These methods would definitely yield results indicating, fair
to say, different conclusions about the sustainability of the current borrowing
policy, but nevertheless provide a little clearer insight into what today looks quite
difficult to perceive and a somewhat firmer basis for contemplation and discussion.
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6.1 Debt indicators
of the Republic of Croatia 
A comparison of the basic debt indicators calculated for the
Republic of Croatia (common in an economic analysis) with indicators of the same
kind for a sample of countries, is the simplest way of analyzing Croatia's debt.
Therefore, the following indicators have been calculated and laid out in Table 1 for
a sample of 13 countries and the Republic of Croatia:
        1. the share of interest on public debt in total revenues of
consolidated central government (K/UP2),
        2. the share of interest on public debt in total expenditures of
consolidated central government (K/UI2),
        3. the share of interest on public debt in GDP (K/BDP),
        4. the share of deficit in total expenditures of consolidated central
government (D/UI2),
        5. the share of deficit in GDP (D/BDP),
        6. the share of public debt in GDP ((B/BDP),
        7. the share of internal public debt in GDP (Bd/BDP), and
        8. the share of external public debt in GDP (Bf/BDP).
The sample contains the following 13 countries: Ireland, Malta,
Cyprus, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland,
Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Slovakia. These countries have been selected for several
reasons:
        a) These countries are comparable with the Republic of Croatia
because, like the Republic of Croatia, they belong to the group
of middle-income European countries.
        b) Ireland, Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey are countries with an
average real growth rate of 3.5-6 percent in the period from
1993 to 1995. Accordingly, these are the economies which in
the indicated period achieved the growth rates that are being
forecast for Croatia for the following years.
        c) Spain, Portugal, and Greece are the countries that have become
members of the EU despite less developed economies, and are
therefore comparable with the Republic of Croatia, which is also
aspiring for EU membership.
        d) Austria is interesting as a new member of the EU.
        e) The Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Slovakia
are transition countries like Croatia. With the exception of
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Bulgaria, these countries are among the more successful ones in
the process of transition to market economy.
The years taken as a reference are 1994, as the last year for
which data in the majority of the countries observed are available, and 1993, for the
countries with no available data for 1994. For Slovakia and Croatia data have been
taken for 1995 and 1996, respectively. These are considered as more relevant than
1994.
Data on consolidated central government have been taken into
consideration. Data on a consolidated general government, which would be more
appropriate for international comparisons were not available at the accessible data
sources. Only the indicators for Slovenia were calculated by means of data for the
overall public sector, since data in Slovenia are not prepared according to the
methodology of Government Finance Statistics (GFS), among which the data on
consolidated central government would also be found.
For the Republic of Croatia, the data on public debt refer to the
entire public sector.
Among the indicators the most important are those on the share
of deficit and debt in GDP. Table 1 indicates that the deficit/GDP ratio in the
countries observed varies from (+)3.2 in Slovakia to 12.73 in Greece. Except for the
Czech Republic and Slovakia as countries with a budget surplus, Croatia has, with
0.92 in 1995 and 0.46 in 1996, achieved the lowest deficit amounts.
Also, the share of public debt in GDP differs considerably from
one country to another, acquiring values ranging from 18.71 percent in the Czech
Republic to very high 103.78 of GDP in Greece and 147.82 percent in Bulgaria.
The Croatian debt is somewhat higher than the one in low-debt Malta and
Slovakia.
The above data may be roughly connected to the Maastricht
criteria of 3 percent of GDP for deficit and 60 percent of GDP for debt, although
this condition for deficit refers to the debt of a consolidated overall government and
the condition for the debt refers to the total public sector debt. In both analyzed
years, Croatia met both criteria, unlike e.g. Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Poland, and
Bulgaria, which in the years indicated did not satisfy the limit of 60 percent of the
share of debt in GDP, and unlike Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, and
Bulgaria, which realized a deficit higher than the one allowed for admission to the
European Union. Consequently, out of the 14 countries indicated, apart from
Croatia, the only countries that could qualify for admission to the EMU are Malta,
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Greece. It should be mentioned here
once again that the picture could be different if the data referred to a consolidated
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general government, i.e. to the overall public sector.
Interestingly, all countries in the group of countries with a low
growth rate have quite low values of both indicators - in other words, they meet at
least one Maastricht criterion. The countries with the most unfavorable deficit
ratios, i.e. deficit/GDP ratios, are the ones that already are members of the
European Union, thus being less concerned about seeing the door of the EMU
closed (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria), as well as Bulgaria as a country of a slower
and less efficient transition process.
Croatia has a relatively low share of interest rates in
government revenues and expenditures, i.e. in GDP. In comparison with Croatia,
only Bulgaria has a lower proportion of interest in total revenues, expenditures, and
GDP respectively. However, in Bulgaria, such low interest rates on public debt in
1994 may be considered merely as a non-typical phenomenon. The fact is that
Bulgaria had a very high public debt of 1.47 of GDP in that year, which it did not
repay at the time because of some unresolved relations with creditors - the Paris
and London Clubs.
Since a large number of countries have started their fiscal
reforms and restrictive debt policies after the proclamation of the Maastricht
criteria, one can notice in all the monitored countries, as well as in Croatia, that
the share of interest in GDP is bigger than the share of new debt (deficit) in GDP,
meaning that the obligations stemming from the old debt are higher than new
borrowing, which in the future will lead to a drop in the total public debt level
(provided that there will be no turning point in the debt policy, i.e. stronger reliance
on debt financing).
The data in Table 1 suggest that in the public debt structure of
the developed countries there still prevails internal public debt, which is much
more favorable for the external stability of a country. Among the "fast growing
economies", Turkey alone owns more than one-half of the total debt to foreign
countries. Unlike that, Croatia is among the transition countries which, due to a
lack of their own savings, rely to a great extent on covering the deficit by foreign
savings (the situation is similar in Poland and Bulgaria, whereas for Slovenia the
data on total public debt are not available).
It follows from Table 1 that, in comparison with the 13
countries, Croatia does not have a distinct need for reducing the public debt
because all debt indicators show that it is better off. The level of foreign debt may
become the only source of problems, as it is currently 20.5 percent of GDP. This
value is lower only than the one for Bulgaria, Poland, Turkey, and Greece.
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Table 1 
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Table 2 shows the standard indicators of the tax burden and the
size of government for selected countries, i.e. shares of tax revenues and total public
expenditures calculated for three different scopes of government - central
government (1), consolidated central government (2), and general government (3).
Since it was not possible to collect data on consolidated general government
because different data sources had to be used (Revenue statistics, Government
Financial Statistics, OECD Economic Survey and data of national ministries of
finance), the values for general government were obtained as approximate values,
by adding up where it was possible the corresponding values for consolidated
general government and local level of government. Since consolidation has not
been conducted, it can be assumed that the obtained values overrate real amounts
of indicators PP3/BDP and UI3/BDP.
For the Republic of Croatia, the values used were GDP in
current prices amounting to HRK 94,624 million in 1995 and HRK 103,250
million in 1996. Since there are no data on tax revenues of extrabudgetary funds
in the accounts of consolidated central government, it was assumed that all fund
revenues were a result of social security contributions, which by definition are tax
revenues. It was assumed that, in 1996, the achieved levels of tax revenues and
total expenses on the local level in the Republic of Croatia were equal to the budget
values.
It can be concluded from the calculated shares of tax revenues
of central government in GDP that Croatia belongs to the countries whose citizens
and businesses have a higher burden of paying taxes to the central government;
still, that burden of 28 percent may be considered more or less normal. However,
when payments to extrabudgetary funds (such as various social securit
contributions) are added to this figure, the tax burden in the Republic of Croatia
climbs up to 44.12 percent, which is a maximum level of this indicator in the
countries observed.
Indicator of the tax burden on the general government level in
the Republic of Croatia amounts to 47.53 percent, which also represents the
highest value of this indicator. In terms of this criterion, only the Czech Republic
comes close to Croatia with its 43.25 percent of the share of general government
tax revenues in GDP. However, it should be noted here that data on the tax burden
considerably differ from one source to another. Data with which the data of the
same kind for the Republic of Croatia have been compared so far are the ones
obtained from GFS. Data from Revenue Statistics for OECD countries (hereinafter:
RS) are quite different (they are listed in the shadowed line with the mark RS in the
first column). If RS data are taken as more relevant, then the tax burden in Croatia
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The difference between the data in the two used sources, which are regularly16
considered in literature as the most relevant ones, instigated the research for its causes
during the project preparation. Co-operation has been established with the research
staff of the International Monetary Fund, which helped to reach at least a partial
explanation of the mismatch in those data.  The basic cause of this mismatch is not,
as it appears, the difference in the methodology of data preparation, but in the data
scope.  The GFS scope is generally narrower, because this statistics frequently exclude
social security funds, i.e. the majority of extrabudgetary funds.  Furthermore, in some
countries lower government levels in GFS data are not included in the definition of
consolidated general government.  Different scopes of general government from one
country to another make GFS an inappropriate data source for international
comparisons.  We have therefore been advised to rely, in comparisons to general
government, on more complete data of Revenue Statistics.
is not so much different from the one in the observed countries.  In this case, the16
tax burden in Croatia is remains as the highest, but the Czech Republic, Austria,
and Ireland are quite close in terms of the tax burden. 
With respect to the size of the central government as an
indicator (UI1/BDP), the Republic of Croatia again does not stand out among the
observed countries, with its share of central government total expenditures in GDP
at approximately 30 percent. When expenditures in extrabudgetary funds are taken
into consideration, the Republic of Croatia, with the share of the expenditures of
its consolidated central government climbing up to approximately 47 percent of
GDP, again comes to the top, right after Slovakia. Taking into consideration the
widest scope of government, i.e. consolidated central government enlarged by the
expenditures of local government, it turns out again that Croatia has the biggest
public sector among the analyzed countries, just a bit smaller than Ireland, which
is a leading country when it comes to this indicator. The problem of relevance of
data should be stressed here again, since RS data are also quite different in terms
of this indicator. Still, whatever data are used for comparison purposes, it turns out
that Croatia has a very big public sector and according to this criterion is on top
among the countries considered here.
7
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE OBTAINED
RESULTS FOR THE FUTURE BORROWING POLICY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA 
Data indicating that Croatia may be considered as a country
with a high tax burden and a big public sector have significant implications on the
public debt policy, as well as on macroeconomic policy in general. First, taxes and
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loans should be observed as alternative sources of financing public needs. If a
country opts for financing public needs by taxes, borrowing requirements should
be lower, and vice versa. The indicators mentioned may be used as a confirmation
of this, as it can be seen that countries with a great difference between tax revenues
and total expenditures usually have high public debt levels.
Croatia, being a country with a high tax burden, should be able
to meet its public financing needs from collected tax revenues. Should it, however,
be assessed that borrowing is a more favorable variety of financing, the tax burden
should be decreased. 
In addition, public debt should first of all be used for
stabilization purposes, i.e. in periods of major crises, wars, and political strives, so
as to enable the smallest possible drop in available income. In relatively peaceful
times, with a growing GDP as an implicit tax base, it makes no sense to raise
loans, no matter how favorable they are. Every loan needs to be repaid in future, so
if the aim is to relieve the economy from tax payments in the future, then current
borrowing is not in line with such an aim.
Furthermore, besides the sustainable level of public debt, the
level of foreign debt is also important. More specifically, although the share of
public debt in GDP in the Republic of Croatia is still bearable, the foreign
component of the debt today may have become almost unbearable. 
Finally, when debt is considered from the aspect of its
dynamics, it can be noticed that nowadays the average interest rate on existing debt
is approximately the same as the real GDP growth rate, or higher than that. This
means that the debt burden in the future will be growing in real terms, and that,
with a continuation of the current tendencies, the limit of public debt sustainability
will be reached sooner or later.
In the end, it may be good to remember that the "unwritten
limits of borrowing exist when the population considers a debt as evil"
(Heinemann, 1994). In other words, voters should determine the final limit of
borrowing in a democracy, not government institutions.
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LIST OF SYMBOLS:
B = public debt
T = total public sector revenues
G = total public sector expenditures
D = total fiscal deficit






M = monetary base
b = share of public debt in output
t = share of total public sector revenues in output
g = share of total public sector expenditures (without interest) in output
d = share of total fiscal deficit in output 
p = share of primary deficit in output
s = share of primary surplus in output
n = real output growth rate
w = nominal output growth rate
r = average long-term real interest rate
i = nominal interest rate
k = tax rate required for debt servicing
" = a part of income saved by citizens as government bonds
$ = a public debt growth rate
B = prices growth rate (inflation rate)
e = domestic currency real exchange rate
A = foreign exchange reserves
K = government net value 
E = expected value
t = symbol for current period
j = symbol for last period
f = symbol for value expressed in foreign currency units
d = symbol for value expressed in domestic currency units
N = symbol for nominal values
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